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1617 
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL COURTS’ 
HEALTHCARE ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: DOES 
THE PPACA SPELL THE END TO HOSPITAL 
MERGERS?  
INTRODUCTION  
Since the 1990s, the trend for hospitals in the United States has been to 
combine resources and merge into larger systems.
1
 In 2013, for example, 
Community Health Systems of Tennessee and Health Management 
Associates of Florida combined in a $7.6 billion deal.
2
 Over 300 hospital 
acquisitions have occurred between 2007 and 2012, and many, like the 
merger between Tennessee and Florida hospitals, have been single 
hospitals forming new systems.
3
 Newly formed hospital systems have 
largely been successful in defending against antitrust challenges.
4
 For 
example, in the late 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
suffered six straight losses in healthcare antitrust cases it filed in federal 
courts.
5
 These cases showed that the FTC struggled to define the relevant 
markets
6
 and judges were reluctant to enforce antitrust principles to 
nonprofit hospitals.
7
 Indeed, courts deferred to merging hospitals in the 
belief that hospitals achieving economies of scale were in the best interests 
 
 
 1. Julie Creswell & Reed Abelson, New Laws and Rising Costs Create a Surge of Supersizing 
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/business/bigger-hospitals-
may-lead-to-bigger-bills-for-patients.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. FTI CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE ECONS. AND POLICY, HOW HOSPITAL MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS BENEFIT COMMUNITIES 5 (2013), available at http://www.aha.org/content/13/13merge 
benefitcommty.pdf.  
 4. For discussion of the general ambivalence of courts dealing with healthcare markets, see 
Martin Gaynor, Why Don’t Courts Treat Hospitals Like Tanks for Liquefied Gases? Some Reflections 
on Health Care Antitrust Enforcement, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 497 (2006). 
 5. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION, ch. 4, at 1 n.7 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/health_care/ 204694. 
pdf. 
 6. Antitrust challenges require the FTC to define the relevant geographic and product markets. 
See generally Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 121 (2007); see also FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 269 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that “the FTC failed to produce sufficient evidence on the crucial aspect of the geographic market”). 
 7. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 (W.D. Mich. 1996) 
(“[N]onprofit hospitals operate differently in highly-concentrated markets than do profit-maximizing 
firms.”). However, not all courts accepted this premise. See United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 
898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (1990) (regardless of the nonprofit classification, “people do not like to compete, 
and will seek ways of avoiding competition by agreement tacit or explicit, depending of course on the 
costs of agreeing”).  
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of the public because, “[i]n the real world, hospitals are in the business of 
saving lives” and would not abuse market power.8  
Arguably, these unsuccessful antitrust challenges have given hospitals 
“a green light to consolidation.”9 The FTC admits that court decisions in 
this area have led enforcers to stay away from hospital mergers.
10
 One 
problem for the FTC is that courts have struggled to apply antitrust law to 
the healthcare sector.
11
 Making matters worse, it is widely acknowledged 
that courts analyzing hospital mergers have failed to apply sound 
economic principles in defining relevant markets.
12
  
Regardless of the reasons for consolidation, it has been harmful to the 
general public.
13
 Studies show that hospital market concentration in the 
1990s caused inpatient prices to rise at least five percent and more than 
forty percent when the merging hospitals were in competition with each 
other.
14
 Another study performed in Massachusetts found that pricing for 
health services was positively correlated with provider market power and 
uncorrelated with “differences in quality, complexity of services, or other 
 
 
 8. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1302.  
 9. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Consequent Impact on Competition 
in Healthcare: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of the 
H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2013) [hereinafter PPACA Hearing] (prepared statement 
of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney, Saint Louis University School of Law), http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
_cache/files/565cd9fa-8a86-40a4-9bad-99827e678de2/113-51-82848.pdf.  
 10. Victoria Stagg Elliott, FTC, in Turnabout, Takes a Closer Look at Hospital Mergers, AM. 
MED. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120409/business/304099973/7/.  
 11. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health 
Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847 (2011). Other scholars suggest the lack of transparency in medical 
procedures leads to higher medical bills charged by hospitals. Keith T. Peters, What Have We Here? 
The Need for Transparent Pricing and Quality Information in Health Care: Creation of an SEC for 
Health Care, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 363, 364–65 (2007). 
 12. See, e.g., Cory S. Capps et al., The Silent Majority Fallacy of the Elzinga-Hogarty Criteria: 
A Critique and New Approach to Analyzing Hospital Mergers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8216, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8216.  
 13. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 5 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney); 
see also Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Costs of Care and Administration at For-
Profit and Other Hospitals in the United States, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 769, 772–74 (1997) (claiming 
that large hospital systems threaten patient care, remove the existence of local control, and become 
more motivated on the “bottom line”); Judith C. Applebaum & Jill C. Morrison, Hospital Mergers and 
the Threat to Women’s Reproductive Health Services: Applying the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 1 (2000) (expressing concern regarding the negative effect of hospital mergers on 
women’s health services); Don Lee, Closures Put Big Hospital Chains Under Microscope, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A1 (discussing the ramifications of the purchases of small hospitals by larger 
chains, resulting in concentrated market power).  
 14. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS 
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 4 (2006), 
available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwjf 
12056_1. 
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factors the health care market should reward.”15 This means that the higher 
the market concentration, the higher the cost for the consumer—exactly 
what antitrust law seeks to avoid.
16
  
Recently, however, judges’ favorable perspective toward nonprofit 
hospital mergers has shifted. For example, in 2012, two hospital chains in 
Illinois were blocked from merging after the FTC challenged the deal.
17
 
The FTC argued that the combination of the two hospitals would “have 
anticompetitive effects.”18 The problem for the FTC was that the two 
hospitals had no agreement in place to maintain current hospital charges 
for patients.
19
 Without that agreement, there was no guarantee that the 
newly formed system would not increase patient prices.
20
 Outside the 
courts, scholars have become more critical of hospital mergers as well. 
Similar to the FTC’s argument above, they reason that providers are 
concentrating to enable them to charge higher prices for patients.
21
 Making 
matters worse, it has been suggested that healthcare providers enjoy more 
freedom in pricing than other monopolies such as the diamond industry 
and public utilities.
22
 One reason for this relaxed approach by federal 
courts is that hospitals have a redistributive component that provides care 
to indigent patients.
23
  
This Note acknowledges the harm of hospital concentration and will 
focus on recent governmental efforts to block hospital mergers. 
Specifically, Part I will explain the structure of hospital antitrust claims. 
Part II will provide an analysis of recent case law and identify trends in 
FTC antitrust enforcement. This Part will describe why federal judges 
shifted their favorable approach to hospital consolidation. Finally, this 
Note argues that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
 
 
 15. MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND 
COST DRIVERS PURSUANT TO G.L. C. 6D, § 8, at 6 (2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
ago/docs/healthcare/2013-hcctd.pdf. 
 16. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).  
 17. FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 18. Id. at 1076. Measuring market share in terms of the number of patient admissions and the 
length of patient stays, the court held that the FTC met its burden in demonstrating that the merger 
would lead to an illegal concentration of firms in the market. Id. at 1078.  
 19. Id. at 1082.  
 20. Id.  
 21. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 848. Generally, higher bargaining leverage for 
suppliers works to the detriment of consumers. See id.  
 22. See, e.g., id. 
 23. Id. at 847.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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(“PPACA”),24 combined with new government regulation, will work to 
ameliorate the monopoly problem in the health care sector.
25
  
I. OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES  
A. The Clayton Act  
The economic rationale of antitrust law is that, in a freely operating 
competitive market, consumers are given the widest variety of choices at 
the lowest prices.
26
 The Clayton Act is the statute that governs antitrust 
merger claims and seeks to eradicate anticompetitive transactions.
27
 
Specifically, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions “where in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce . . . the effect 
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend 
to create a monopoly.”28 Section 7 is designed to protect against “the 
substantial lessening of competition from the acquisition by one 
corporation of the whole or any part of the stock of a competing 
corporation.”29 Thus, antitrust laws seek to remove barriers to healthy and 
vibrant competition such as an agreement between two firms to raise 
prices or two firms merging solely to gain market power.
30 
Without 
Section 7, two firms can increase their market power by merging and 
thereby increase prices for patients. 
 
Once a merger challenge is brought, the court determines the likely 
anticompetitive effects in the market.
31
 To determine whether there is a 
reasonable probability of a reduction in competition, the courts have 
focused on whether the transaction has the “potential for creating, 
enhancing, or facilitating the exercise of market power—the ability of one 
or more firms to raise prices above competitive levels for a significant 
period of time.”32 The court’s analysis takes two steps. First, the court 
defines the relevant market that the merger is likely to affect.
33
 Second, the 
 
 
 24. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029.  
 25. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 851. 
 26. U.S. FED. TRADE CMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, ch. 2, at 1.  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). The Clayton Act prohibits price discrimination, exclusive dealings, or 
mergers that either create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition. Id. §§ 17–19.  
 28. Id. § 18.  
 29. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).  
 30. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 312–13 (1962).  
 31. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 136–37 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).  
 32. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 33. See id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/8
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court determines whether the merged entity would have a significant 
market power in the defined market.
34
 For a plaintiff to establish a prima 
facie case under the Clayton Act, he or she must demonstrate that an entity 
would control “an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and 
would result in a significant increase in the concentration of power in that 
market.”35 The defendants may rebut this prima facie showing by 
producing evidence that the merger will not create anticompetitive 
effects.
36
 For example, this can be done by showing the merger will create 
significant efficiencies that would benefit consumers.
37
 The court then 
weighs the competing views and decides whether to block the merger.
38
  
B. Defining the Relevant Market and Determining if a Merged Entity Has 
Significant Market Power  
Importantly, the court must define the relevant market that the 
proposed transaction might impact.
39
 Courts have determined that “[a] 
‘relevant market’ consists of two components: a product market, and a 
geographic market.”40 The product market is determined by “the cross-
elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.”41 In 
other words, the product market is defined by the responsiveness of the 
demand for a good to a change in the price of another good.
42
 For 
example, suppose a grocery store sells 2% milk and whole milk. If the 
store decides to raise the price of 2% milk, the demand for whole milk 
might increase because consumers will purchase the substitute. The ability 
for consumers to substitute goods limits the stores’ ability to increase 
prices. The harder it is for the store to increase the price of milk, the higher 
the cross-elasticity of demand will be. Thus, the product market (whole 
 
 
 34. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 136–37. 
 35. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Mich. 1996).  
 36. Id. 
 37. FTC. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991).  
 38. See id.  
 39. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 136–37. Courts’ objective in defining the 
relevant market for antitrust purposes is to uncover where competition exists. Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962). Because substitutes, by nature, compete in the same market, 
substitutability of supply is a central criterion for setting the boundaries of the market. United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (goods that can be “reasonably 
interchangeable by consumers” should be seen as in the same market).  
 40. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 136. 
 41. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325.  
 42. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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milk and 2% milk in the above example) is determined by the range of 
products that would limit the merged entity’s ability to raise prices.43 
The geographic market is defined by the existence of competitors who 
are close enough to provide similar products.
44 
The ultimate question is 
whether consumers can practically turn to alternatives.
45
 Defining the 
geographic market is highly fact intensive and can often be determinative 
of the court’s outcome.46 For example, assume there are two grocery stores 
in a town that sell milk and one grocery store that is forty miles away that 
also sells milk. If the two grocery stores in town attempted to merge, a 
court could define the relevant market as the two stores in town, which 
would destroy the market for milk in that geographic market. 
Alternatively, a court could instead decide to include the store that is forty 
miles away because consumers might travel to that store if prices were too 
high. Thus, if the geographic market were limited to the two local grocery 
stores, then the anticompetitive effect of those stores merging would be 
very high. But if the market included all three grocery stores, then the 
anticompetitive effect of the two grocery stores merging would be very 
small. The same problem is prevalent in the hospital merger setting, and 
how the relevant market is defined typically determines the outcome of the 
case.
47
  
Defining the relevant market in the health care setting can be especially 
problematic.
48
 The Clayton Act prohibits any merger having an 
 
 
 43. United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as 
moot on unrelated grounds, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).  
 44. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (W.D. Mich. 1996).  
 45. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. at 975–76.  
 46. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1291.  
 47. See FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *7, *9 
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (granting a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs by defining the relevant 
market broadly to include tertiary, quaternary, outpatient, and general acute-care services together). 
 48. See, e.g., Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. at 979 (considering whether patient loyalty 
should factor into the determination of the relevant market). Many problems arise in the decision to 
aggregate different treatments offered by hospitals such as cancer therapy, tertiary services, and heart 
surgery. See Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 877–79 (2004). Aggregating all treatments may be an overly simplistic way to 
analyze hospital mergers primarily because services draw from different geographic areas. Id. at 883–
84. For example, complicated tertiary services may draw patients from all across the state whereas 
emergency services only draw patients from a limited geographic area. See id. Studies demonstrate 
that combining all inpatient services may conceal the concentration of certain hospital services while 
separating out services could reveal a strong market power. See Seth Sacher & Louis Silvia, Antitrust 
Issues in Defining the Product Market for Hospital Services, 5 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 181, 183–85 
(1998); see also Jack Zwanziger et al., Hospitals and Antitrust: Defining Markets, Setting Standards, 
19 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 423, 436–39 (1994) (breaking up hospital inpatient services into 
distinct categories). Therefore, using clusters can lead to a misleading analysis of the market power 
possessed over a certain hospital service. Greaney, supra, at 882–84. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/8
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anticompetitive effect “in any line of commerce . . . in any section of the 
country,”49 and forbids any merger that would likely cause a competitive 
harm in the market for any services that hospitals provide.
50
 Proving the 
likely competitive harm in a market can be challenging because different 
hospital service lines draw patients from different distances.
51
 For 
example, in United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center,
52
 the 
court struggled to define the competitive influences of nearby hospitals.
53
 
The court noted that hospitals offering specialty services, especially 
teaching and research hospitals, might draw patients from a very broad 
geographic area.
54
 Because patients are drawn from all over the state for 
these specialty services such as chronic conditions of cancer, identifying 
the geographic area is difficult.
55 
By contrast, emergency services are 
drawn from a very narrow geographic area.
56 
Therefore, combining 
specialty services with emergency services is problematic because 
emergency services draw patients from a limited geographic area.
57
  
The problem in hospital merger cases is that federal judges need to 
decide whether to combine hospital service lines or separate them out. On 
one hand, if a court defines the relevant market as overly broad, the 
merger’s effects will likely appear insignificant and the court will 
underestimate the anticompetitive effects.
58
 On the other hand, a relevant 
market that is defined too narrowly will overestimate the anticompetitive 
effects and block an otherwise legitimate merger between two hospitals.
59
 
Because defining the relevant market can be the deciding factor in many of 
these antitrust claims, the judge’s decision to choose one economist over 
the other is often dispositive.
60
 Therefore, the court must address both the 
 
 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).  
 50. Id. 
 51. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, ch. 4, at 21–24.  
 52. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 53. Id. at 137–42. 
 54. Id. at 125. 
 55. Id. at 141. See also Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 1029 (5th 
Cir. 2000). The georgraphic area is dependent on the type of medical service because “emergcy care 
must be swift, and hence close, but longer travel times are toleratble when obtaining outpatient care for 
chronic conditions.” Id. at 1029.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1052–54 (8th Cir. 1999) (examining the 
relevant market for hospitals in a poorly defined area).  
 59. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137–40 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997) (analyzing a merger with unclear influences of nearby hospitals).  
 60. “Without a well-defined relevant market, a merger’s effect on competition cannot be properly 
evaluated.” Id. at 1051. Moreover, often a monopolization claim “succeeds or fails strictly on the 
definition of the product or geographic market.” Id. at 1052; see also United States v. Mercy Health 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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product market and the geographic market to accurately identify the 
correct relevant market.
61
 
C. Mitigating Factors Used to Rebut the Government’s Prima Facie 
Showing  
If the FTC makes a prima facie showing of an antitrust violation, courts 
have established that a defendant may rebut the government’s showing in 
a number of ways.
62 
First, a hospital system can produce evidence that the 
defendant’s market-share statistics are inaccurate for the “effects on 
competition in the relevant market.”63 To meet this burden, a defendant 
often relies on nonstatistical evidence such as bias that may “cast[] doubt 
on the persuasive quality of the statistics to predict future anticompetitive 
consequences.”64 Second, a hospital system can rebut the prima facie 
showing by offering evidence “that the intended merger would create 
significant efficiencies in the relevant market”65 or that the merger “would 
result in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would 
benefit the consumers.”66 Such a showing proves that the proposed merger 
would actually benefit the community because it would “enhance[] rather 
than hinder[] competition as a result of the gained efficiencies.”67  
The third way that a hospital system can rebut a prima facie showing is 
by proving the acquired hospital was in a state of financial “weakness.”68 
 
 
Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 979 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot on unrelated grounds, 107 F.3d 632 
(8th Cir. 1997) (finding insufficient evidence to extend the relevant market based on patient loyalty).  
 61. See id. at 140. Over time, the relevant product market has come to be defined by the ability to 
increase prices profitably by a “small but significant” amount for a meaningful period of time. U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.1 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010. 
html. 
 62. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1220–24 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the relevant 
market has been defined, courts have employed a burden-shifting approach to determine whether the 
FTC will likely succeed on the merits of its Section 7 claim. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has articulated that a merger with these characteristics “is so 
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence 
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.” United States v. 
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).  
 63. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. Id. at 715 n.7.  
 65. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1222.  
 66. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 147; see also Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1223. 
 67. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 147; see also United States v. Country Lake 
Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 680 (D. Minn. 1990).  
 68. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1221. However, the acquisition of a financially weak company is 
not automatically immune from Section 7 scrutiny. Id. The court in University Health stated that such 
a defense will only be granted in “rare circumstances” and drew a distinction between a financially 
weak firm and a failing firm. Id. The “failing company” defense is only allowed if: (1) the firm being 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/8
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For example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Freeman Hospital,
69
 the 
court explained that the hospital in question had been experiencing 
financial problems and was struggling to compete in the challenging 
healthcare market.
70
 The hospital’s trustees sought to merge with another 
hospital to remain financially sustainable.
71
 Had the court focused 
primarily on increasing the number of participants in the market, the court 
would have denied the merger.
72
 Instead, the court valued the likelihood 
that the merged entity would be able to compete in the market.
73
 
Additionally, in Long Island Jewish Medical Center,
74
 the court found that 
the merged entity would decrease equipment costs, increase the ability to 
share staff and facilities, and create efficiencies in computer services.
75
 
The court saw these factors as offsetting the anticompetitive risks proved 
by the FTC.
76
 Therefore, the court held that “the proposed merger will 
result in significant efficiencies in the form of annual operating savings in 
expenses in the sum of approximately 25 to 30 million dollars per year.”77  
Fourth, federal judges have tolerated mergers between nonprofit 
hospitals because of expressed commitment to the community.
78
 Courts 
have defined community commitment as a “series of formal assurances . . . 
to assuage any purchaser concerns and to reiterate [the hospitals’] strong 
conviction that the purpose and intent of the transaction is to reduce 
costs.”79 The rationale behind this approach is that nonprofit hospitals 
differ from conventional monopolists because they do not abuse market 
power.
80
 Under the federal tax code, nonprofit hospitals must use profits 
for charitable purposes.
81
 Therefore, it is argued that the entity’s exercise 
of market power is benign.
82
 For example, in FTC v. Butterworth Health 
 
 
acquired faces a high probability of bankruptcy and (2) the merger is the only means for avoiding 
failure. See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136–39 (1969).  
 69. 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).  
 70. Id. at 262.  
 71. Id.  
 72. See id. at 270–71.  
 73. Id. at 272.  
 74. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 75. Id. at 148. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1996).  
 79. Id. (alteration in original). 
 80. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 858.  
 81. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); see also Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 858. 
 82. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 858. Courts that adopt this point of view 
frequently cite a Third Circuit decision, United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993), 
allowing a university to violate antitrust principles to fund scholarships for needy students. Id. at 678–
79; see also Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir. 2005); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. 
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Corp.,
83
 the district judge was certain that the nonprofit hospitals’ ultimate 
goal was to establish “world-class health facilities.”84 Thus, the district 
judge allowed a merger that would otherwise have violated Section 7.
85
 It 
reasoned that the proposed merger would allow the board of directors the 
discretion to improve the quality of healthcare and act in the best interests 
of the public.
86
 Because of judges’ historical deference to nonprofit 
hospitals, government agencies have found it difficult to convince courts 
that these hospitals would use market power to the detriment of the 
public.
87
  
II. RESURGENCE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT  
Recently, the government antitrust enforcement agencies have 
increased their efforts to block anticompetitive mergers.
88
 In 2007, the 
FTC challenged a merger, four years after the merger had been 
consummated, in a case that marked a substantial change in federal courts’ 
antitrust analysis.
89
 In the last three years, the FTC has challenged four 
 
 
ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 
1367 (3d Cir. 1996). In Brown University, the court held that redirecting scholarship funds to low 
income students might act as a defense to an antitrust claim because of the charitable purpose. Brown 
Univ., 5 F.3d at 678–79. 
 83. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
 84. Id. at 1302. Some scholars have understood hospital mergers as a way to counteract 
physician demands for equipment, and greater market concentration would therefore improve matters 
by reducing expenses in marginally useful equipment and amenities. See Peter J. Hammer, 
Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-Price Competition in Hospital 
Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 736 (1999) (citing studies that demonstrate “a strong and 
consistent negative relationship between measures of hospital cost and levels of economic 
concentration”). 
 85. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302–03.  
 86. Id. at 1298. Other courts reviewing hospital mergers took a similar approach. FTC v. 
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1995). In Freeman, a Missouri judge said to the federal 
agency, “I don’t think you’ve got any business being in here. . . . It looks to me like Washington D.C. 
once again thinks they know better what’s going on in southwest Missouri. I think they ought to stay in 
D.C.” Id. at 263 (quoting district court). 
 87. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1298.  
 88. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 7 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
 89. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 2286195 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007). In 
addition to the significance of analyzing the case postmerger, the court also rejected a claim that the 
relevant product market includes hospital-based outpatient services. Id. at *46–47. Defendants argued 
that the relevant product market should consider all purchases made by a customer in determining the 
relevant product market making it less likely to find an antitrust violation. Evanston Nw. Healthcare 
Corp., No. 9315, 2005 WL 2845790, at *106 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 2005) (initial decision), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051020initialdecision.pdf, aff’d, 2007 WL 2286195 (F.T.C. Aug. 
6, 2007) (citing United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
Administrative Law Judge Steven J. McGuire stated that “the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/8
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hospital mergers.
90
 The courts in these cases changed their definition of 
the relevant markets and “unbundled” hospital service lines in holding for 
the FTC.
91
 Even the Supreme Court has weighed in on a hospital antitrust 
case. In FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Systems, the Court denied the 
application of the state-action doctrine and found that the hospital merger 
was facilitated by hospital executives desire to increase patient charges.
92
 
The Court held that state-action immunity did not apply because Georgia 
failed to describe why allowing a hospital to substantially reduce 
competition would be a benefit to the public.
93
 Applied together, these 
cases demonstrate a strong resurgence of antitrust enforcement in the 
hospital-merger setting and a rejection of previous holdings giving 
deference to nonprofit hospital mergers.
94
 The next section will describe 
how courts departed from accepting traditional hospital-merger defenses 
and began to limit the consolidation of hospitals.   
 
 
has explicitly rejected an approach that defined the relevant product market as all the services provided 
by the merging parties and demanded by customers.” Id. 
 90. See OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 9349, 2012 WL 1355604 (F.T.C. Apr. 13, 2012) (dismissed 
upon merger abandonment), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9349/120413rockford 
order.pdf; ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 9346, 2012 WL 1155392 (F.T.C. Mar. 28, 2012) (petition 
for review on file with 6th Circuit, No. 12-3104), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ 
d9346/120328promedicabrillopinion.pdf; Reading Health Sys., No. 9353, 2012 WL 6188557 (F.T.C. 
Dec. 7, 2012) (dismissed upon acquisition abandonment), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ 
d9353/121116readingsurgicalcmpt.pdf; FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 
(2013). 
 91. ProMedica Health Sys., 2012 WL 1155392. “Unbundled” is another way of saying separated 
out product service lines.  
 92. Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1006. The Court previously held that States may “use their 
municipalities to administer state regulatory policies free of the inhibitions of the federal antitrust laws 
without at the same time permitting purely parochial interests to disrupt the Nation’s free-market 
goals.” City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415–16 (1978). By contrast, in FTC 
v. Phoebe Putney Health System, the issue was whether an otherwise unlawful merger was immunized 
by the state action doctrine. Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1010–11. Respondents argued that “hospital 
authorities are granted unique powers and responsibilities to fulfill the State’s objective of providing 
all residents with access to adequate and affordable health and hospital care.” Id. at 1014. The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that, to satisfy the state action doctrine, the State “must 
have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent with its policy goals.” 
Id. at 1013. The Court reasoned that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the State 
acknowledged how hospital executives would “displace competition by consolidating hospital 
ownership.” Id. at 1011.  
 93. Putney, 133 S. Ct. at 1011. This decision was significant because in the early 1990s, eighteen 
states enacted programs to “provide an exemption from state antitrust laws and also provide immunity 
from federal antitrust enforcement under the state action immunity doctrine.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING THE HEALTH CARE 
INDUSTRY 11 (1994).  
 94. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 7 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
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A. Relevant Market Definition Altered 
Courts defining the product market when looking at hospital mergers 
have generally assumed the product to be acute-care services.
95 
Until 
recently, this broad product-market definition was typical.
96
 In 2010, 
however, the Department of Justice released a revised version of the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“2010 Guidelines”) that attempted to 
increase transparency of agency evaluations.
97
 The 2010 Guidelines clarify 
the definitions of relevant product markets and explain that when 
evaluating product market concentration, “the smallest relevant market” is 
required.
98
 For example, in the case of a merger between two motorcycle 
manufacturers, an agency could not include cars in the same product 
market.
99
 Similar to cars and motorcycles, the 2010 Guidelines would 
prohibit courts from combining different healthcare services such as knee 
surgery and hip surgery.
 
This marked a change in the healthcare antitrust 
 
 
 95. For purposes of the Clayton Act, acute care services are services “necessary to meet the 
medical, surgical, and other needs of inpatients, e.g., operating rooms, anesthesia, intensive care 
capabilities, 24-hour nursing care, lodging, and pharmaceuticals.” FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 
946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996); see also California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 
2d. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding product market includes “not only services provided by 
hospitals that offer the full range of general acute inpatient services, but also those [acute care 
services] available at ‘niche’ hospitals”).  
 96. See Sutter, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.  
 97. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 61. 
 98. Id. § 4.1.1 (“[T]he overarching principle that the purpose of defining the market and 
measuring market shares is to illuminate the evaluation of the competitive effects.”). Hospital merger 
cases have evolved from a belief that the relevant product market should include inpatient and 
outpatient services provided by hospitals, see Am. Med. Int’l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984), to a consensus 
that identifies the market as acute care inpatient services, except for tertiary care. See, e.g., United 
States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990) (market that consisted of 
inpatient acute care services); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 981–83 (N.D. 
Iowa 1995), vacated as moot on unrelated grounds, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (eliminating tertiary 
care services from the product cluster).  
 99. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 61, § 4.1.1. Moreover, the 2010 Guidelines explain that 
antitrust agencies should begin market definition when a product of one merging firm competes with a 
product of another merging firm. Id. § 4.1.3. In other words, a relevant product market should be 
defined by the potential that two firms will compete in a given service line. See Little Rock Cardiology 
Clinic v. Baptist Health, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1140–41 (E.D. Ark. 2008). For example, when 
deciding whether to include tertiary services into the cluster of GAC inpatient hospital services, 
analyzing the number of competitors in each service is important. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 
No. 9346, 2012 WL 2450574, at *39 (F.T.C. June 25, 2012). Patients are likely to travel for complex 
treatments typical of tertiary services, making the number of competitors in tertiary services higher 
than for other GAC services. Id. Because, “only relevant service markets with similar competitive 
conditions” should be grouped together, tertiary and GAC inpatient services should not be aggregated 
in the same cluster market. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/8
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area, because courts started to separate out different hospital services that 
were traditionally combined in the product market analysis.
100
 
The Northern District of Ohio illustrated this approach in FTC v. 
Promedica
101
 when it addressed whether a merger between one health 
system that operated three general acute care hospitals and another 
nonprofit hospital violated Section 7.
102
 The court determined that general 
acute care (“GAC”) was the relevant product market to address the effects 
of the merger.
103
 The court noted that “GAC services are a broad ‘cluster 
market’ of inpatient surgical, medical, and supporting services.”104 
However, when defining the GAC, the court did not include services that 
all four hospitals did not perform,
105
 such as tertiary services.
106
 
Additionally, services that were offered by other providers in the county 
including obstetrical (“OB”) services were also excluded from the GAC 
cluster.
107
  
 
 
 100. See FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *72 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 29, 2011). In FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991), the court 
accepted a broad market definition “for ease of discussion.” Id. at 1211. ProMedica marks a change of 
approach in antitrust analysis that is inconsistent with courts’ analysis of other markets. See United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966). For instance, in Grinnell, the Court found that 
where fire and burgluary services were generally offered, it would be impractical to “break down the 
market into various kinds of central station protective services that are available.” Id. Although some 
customers use a combination of different protective services, the Court noted that the market should be 
defined not by the different purchases but instead by the services provided. Id. at 573.  
 101. No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011). 
 102. Id. at *1, *9–10. 
 103. Id. at *68.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *69. Litigants generally disagree about the appropriate size of the cluster. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 641 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The side seeking a smaller 
market cluster is generally the same party seeking individual product definitions. Id.  
 106. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281, at *69. Prior cases had determined that 
tertiary services should be included in a GAC inpatient hospital services market. See FTC v. 
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (W.D. 1996); United States v. Long Island Jewish 
Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In other cases, both sides have agreed to 
exclude tertiary services from the alleged relevant product market. See Answering and Cross-Appeal 
Brief of Complaint Counsel, at 37, Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2006 WL 447836 
(F.T.C. Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/060210ccattachmnt 
pursuantrule.pdf. In ProMedica, the court noted that defining the relevant market is fact specific, and it 
is not surprising that courts differ on its determination of including tertiary services in the product 
market. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 9346, 2012 WL 2450574, at *39 (F.T.C. June 25, 2012). 
 107. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281, at *72. The court rejected the argument that 
separating OB services would be redundant and not proper since there is no judicial precedent for 
doing so. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 2450574, at *41. The court responded that although 
there is not judicial precedent for specifically separating out OB services from the general product 
cluster, “there [was] judicial precedent for the underlying rationale.” Id. It reasoned that case law 
determined it necessary to separate services “where the group of suppliers for that group of services 
differs from the suppliers of GAC inpatient hospital services.” Id.; see also Butterworth Health Corp., 
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The court held that it would be wrong to include OB services into “the 
cluster market of GAC services because OB services are offered by a 
different set of providers . . . and, thus, are subject to different competitive 
conditions than are GAC services.”108 The practical effect of the FTC 
separating out certain services is that hospitals can no longer lump all 
services in the same equation.
109
 For example, inpatient services and 
outpatient services would be separated because outpatient services can be 
offered by other surgical centers and, therefore, have different 
competitors.
110
 Without the ability to lump all services together, judges 
can individually scrutinize service lines, making mergers less likely to 
survive antitrust violations.
111
  
B. Less Deference to Proposed Efficiencies and Community Involvement  
Federal judges have long held that hospital administrators differ from 
conventional monopolists because of their nonprofit status and their 
potential to increase efficiencies.
112
 The 2010 Guidelines provide that “a 
primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate 
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and 
incentive to compete.”113 This, in turn, “may result in lower prices, 
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”114 Further, a merger 
will not be deemed illegal “if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and 
 
 
946 F. Supp. at 1291 (separating primary care inpatient services and GAC inpatient services because 
of the different suppliers of each service).  
 108. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1219281, at *73. The court concluded that OB 
services “constitute a separate relevant product market” because “[n]o other services are 
interchangeable with OB services.” ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 2450574, at *40. 
Moreover, obstetrics is a distinct field of medicine as seen by providers, “the merging hospitals track 
OB services market shares separately from GAC inpatient services,” and there are “competitive 
alternatives for consumers of OB services” that are different than those for other services in the cluster. 
Id. Therefore, combining OB services with the GAC inpatient hospital service cluster would work 
against the 2010 Guidelines’ goal of analyzing competitive effects. Id.  
 109. See Complaint, Reading Health Sys., No. 9353, 2012 WL 5879804 (F.T.C. Nov. 16, 2012), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/11/121116readingsurgical 
cmpt.pdf. 
 110. See id. at 10.  
 111. See id. at 2.  
 112. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 857–58. Some scholars suggest that courts’ 
aversion to applying traditional antitrust principles to nonprofit-hospital mergers may be a result of the 
natural sympathies for those who run the healthcare organizations. See Peter J. Hammer & William M. 
Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 614–17 (2002) (“The 
small, elite club of individuals from which hospitals draw their boards of trustees shares much with the 
privileged pool from which most federal district court judges emerge.”).  
 113. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 61, § 10.  
 114. See id. 
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magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any 
relevant market.”115 The 2010 Guidelines note that the greater market 
power that a merger would create, “the greater must be the cognizable 
efficiencies.”116 Lower courts allow this defense to rebut the government’s 
prima facie showing.
117
  
A significant change, however, is marked by the 2010 Guidelines note 
that “[e]fficency claims will not be considered if they are vague, 
speculative, or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means.”118 
Accordingly, courts, following this guidance, have taken a vigorous 
approach in analyzing proposed efficiencies.
119
 In FTC v. OSF Healthcare 
System,
120
 the defendant hospitals claimed there would be a $3.2 to $3.6 
million annual saving in consolidation of services and eliminating 
redundancies through their proposed merger.
121
 An expert witness for the 
defense reached this conclusion based on possible cost savings and 
economic incentives.
122
 The redundancies to be eliminated were “on-call 
physicians, trauma center staff, and helicopter crews.”123 The FTC 
responded that the hospital had not even started the process of 
consolidation and did not determine where the consolidated trauma center 
would be located.
124
 Additionally, the hospital’s claimed efficiencies 
through combining service lines were also speculative.
125
 The court held 
that just because “it might make business sense to consolidate trauma 
services after the merger does not guarantee that the identified efficiencies 
will be attained.”126 The court reasoned that the 2010 Guidelines do not 
allow efficiencies supported by “good faith” to be realized.127 Further, the 
court noted that this uncertainty does not reach the cognizable efficiencies 
that the 2010 Guidelines require to rebut the FTC case.
128
  
 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
 118. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 61, § 10.  
 119. See H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721 (“[A] rigorous analysis of the kinds of efficiencies being 
urged by the parties [is] in order to ensure that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than mere 
speculation and promises about post-merger behavior.”).  
 120. 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2012).  
 121. Id. at 1090.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1091.  
 126. Id. at 1090. 
 127. Id.; see also 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 61, § 10.  
 128. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1632 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1617 
 
 
 
 
Other courts, applying close scrutiny to alleged efficiencies, have held 
that when a merger involves a high market concentration courts “generally 
have found inadequate proof of efficiencies to sustain a rebuttal of the 
government’s case.”129 Most recently in ProMedica, the court recognized 
that “[n]o court in a 13(b) proceeding, or otherwise, has found efficiencies 
sufficient to rescue an otherwise illegal merger.”130 Therefore, not only has 
the FTC unbundled certain services provided by the hospital, making it 
easier to challenge hospital mergers, but courts are also beginning to reject 
the idea that nonprofit hospitals will create significant efficiencies from 
consolidation.
131
 In actuality, courts have begun seeing hospital systems as 
no different than other profit-maximizing firms.  
C. Nonprofit Hospitals Losing Their Charitable Defense 
Courts have traditionally tolerated nonprofit hospital mergers because 
of the presence of redistributing profits for charitable purposes in 
hospitals’ charters.132 The idea is that even if a hospital merger causes a 
large net increase in profits, hospitals will channel those funds back to the 
poor areas of the community.
133
 Critics of hospital system consolidation, 
however, have been quick to point out that funds are not always used for 
that assumed purpose.
134
 First, nearly 38% of uninsured Americans come 
from middle class families,
135
 and uninsured middle class families are not 
clearly candidates for charity care provided by a subsidizing hospital.
136
 
Second, hospitals have maintained their tax-exempt status by spending 
 
 
 129. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing ABA ANTITRUST 
SECTION, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 152 (2000)).  
 130. FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *57 (N.D. Ohio 
Mar. 29, 2011). 
 131. See United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 132. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 857–58.  
 133. Id. This was supported by a number of hospital pricing studies that indicated that hospitals 
were able to charge supracompetitive prices regardless of market structure. See, e.g., Monica Noether, 
Competition Among Hospitals, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 259, 277 (1988) (examining Medicare cost reports 
from 1977–78, which found higher costs in more competitive markets); James C. Robinson & Harold 
S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241 (1987) (study 
showing that the more competitive the market structure, the higher the hospital expenses).  
 134. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 858. 
 135. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 21 tbl.6 (2007), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-233.pdf. 
 136. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 858–59. 
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profits on alternative means, departing from true charity care.
137
 For 
instance, nonprofit hospital expenditures include new facilities, medical 
research, and various healthcare training services.
138
  
Following this line of reasoning, courts have now rejected the 
argument used in Butterworth that “nonprofit hospitals operate differently 
in highly-concentrated markets than do profit-maximizing firms” because 
of their commitment to charity care.
139
 In FTC v. OSF, the court stated that 
nonprofit hospitals are seeking to “maximize the reimbursement rates they 
receive.”140 The court distinguished the Butterworth case in one important 
way.
141
 In Butterworth, the court relied on the fact that the merging 
hospitals would freeze prices at both hospitals for three years and curtail 
prices for the following four.
142
 In FTC v. OSF, by contrast, there was no 
agreement to freeze or limit the prices after the merger had been 
consummated.
143
 Thus, the merged entity in OSF would not have the legal 
obligation to curtail prices.
144
 The court in FTC v. OSF also distinguished 
two previous cases:
145
 FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp.,
146
 and United 
States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center.
147
 In FTC v. Tenet Health 
Care Corp., the court allowed two hospitals to merge in Popular Bluff, 
Missouri because “the FTC produced insufficient evidence of a well-
defined relevant geographic market.”148 Similarly, in Long Island Jewish, 
 
 
 137. Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, Fueled by Profits, a Health Care Giant Takes Aim at 
Suburbs, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 21, 2008), https://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/21/fueled-
profits-healthcare-giant-takes-aim-suburbs/hVExi2njp1hUFhQIyRUmuO/story.html. 
 138. Id. At least one scholar notes that these state-of-the-art facilities and specialty training 
services are established through hospital profits and put hospitals in an even stronger power market 
position. Id. Tax authorities have analyzed these expenditures and have considered specialty training 
an “incidental” benefit to a hospital’s goal of promoting healthcare in the community. Id. The IRS 
stated that a specialist receiving advanced training at zero cost through a specialty hospital is not 
enough to “make the private benefit more than incidental.” Id. 
 139. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 (W.D. Mich. 1996); see also 
United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument 
that nonprofit hospitals do not seek to maximize profits through market power); FTC v. Univ. Health, 
Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 1991) (the assumption that the nonprofit hospital “would not 
act anticompetitively was improper”); FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-47, 2011 WL 
1219281, at *22 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (holding that the nonprofit entity “exercises its bargaining 
leverage to obtain the most favorable reimbursement rates possible from commercial health plans”).  
 140. FTC v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2012).  
 141. Id. at 1082.  
 142. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1302. 
 143. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1081–82.  
 146. 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 147. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 148. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1053. The FTC failed “to prove its relevant geographic 
market [was] fatal to its motion for injunctive relief.” Id. 
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the court denied an injunction because the FTC’s product market was 
“unduly restricted to ‘anchor’ hospitals” and failed to include several other 
hospitals in the area.
149
 By contrast, the court in FTC v. OSF found that the 
product and geographic market were properly defined without dispute.
150
 
Essentially, the court in FTC v. OSF limited the previous holdings to 
denying injunctive relief only when the product market is properly 
disputed.
151
 Therefore, arguably, the justification for market consolidation 
because hospitals offer charity care has also been eliminated.  
D. Challenging Mergers After Consummation 
The final change in the policy towards hospital mergers is that mergers 
can now be challenged after the deal has gone through. Specifically, the 
2010 Guidelines state that consummated mergers can be challenged and 
that the “issue is not only whether adverse competitive effects have 
already resulted from the merger, but also whether such effects are likely 
to arise in the future.”152 The agencies use the same analysis when 
reviewing a consummated merger as a post merger review because the 
merged entity may be cognizant of the possibility of a government review 
and keep prices down.
153
  
The 2010 Guidelines’ explicitly allowing consummated mergers to be 
challenged accomplished two things. First, the FTC does not have to seek 
remedy in federal court for an injunction before the merger is complete.
154
 
This provides the FTC with a longer timeline to challenge the merger. 
Second, the FTC in challenging a consummated merger can now prove 
that nonprofit hospitals were in fact using market power to increase 
prices.
155
 This marked a significant change in antitrust application because 
allowing courts to analyze only premerger cases limited the agencies to 
relying on theoretical or speculative anticompetitive effects.
156
 Direct 
proof that hospitals were in fact using market power to increase prices 
worked against the notion that nonprofit hospitals were in the public 
interest rather than monopolists.
157
  
 
 
 149. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 138. 
 150. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.  
 151. Id. 
 152. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 61, § 2.1.1. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 855.  
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
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In Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp.,
158
 Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare Corporation merged with Highland Park Hospital.
159
 The FTC 
challenged the merger four years later, alleging that the merged entity had 
substantially raised prices for managed-care organizations in violation of 
Section 7.
160
 Because the merger had already been consummated, the FTC 
was given the opportunity to examine real data and obtain direct proof that 
abuses were occurring in the pricing practices of nonprofit hospitals.
161
 In 
fact, there was direct evidence in the form of internal documents from 
hospital executives attributing the ability to raise prices to increased 
market share.
162
 Accordingly, the FTC could finally dismiss any expert 
testimony provided in previous hospital merger cases suggesting nonprofit 
hospitals do not abuse pricing practices.
163
  
In analyzing this merger, the court in Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare Corp. first examined minutes from the hospital board’s finance 
committee showing abusive practices.
164
 The President of Northwestern 
Memorial, Mark Neaman, stated that large market share had enabled the 
hospital to negotiate more favorable managed-care contracts.
165
 Neaman 
wrote a memo that explained the increase in revenue from managed-care 
renegotiations to the merged entity: “[N]one of this could have been 
achieved by either Evanston or Highland Park alone.”166 Highland Park 
officials also testified that an opportunity to raise prices came into 
existence post merger and that the merger provided the entity with 
“additional bargaining power.”167 The court held that the merged firm 
raised prices immediately after the consummation, which was in direct 
response to the increased bargaining power of the hospital system in 
relation to the payors.
168
  
Second, the FTC was given the opportunity to dismiss economic 
evidence showing that nonprofit hospitals do not abuse pricing 
practices.
169
 The FTC’s expert discredited economic testimony introduced 
 
 
 158. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 2007). 
 159. Id. at *2. 
 160. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).  
 161. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195 at *13. 
 162. Id. Postmerger documents showed that the health system’s executives understood that the 
ability to increase prices was attributed to the market power gained through the merger. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
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by the defendants that had previously been given in support of the hospital 
merger at issue in Butterworth.
170
 That study was performed by William J. 
Lynk and concluded that nonprofit hospitals had lower prices than for-
profit hospitals in concentrated markets.
171
 In response, the FTC 
introduced data found by Deborah Haas-Wilson, an economic expert from 
the University of California-Berkley,
172
 concluding that the merged entity 
“increased its per day average net prices by 48% for all patients; 46% for 
the commercial and self-pay patients; and 46% for commercial, self-pay, 
self-administered, and HMO patients.”173  
The economic facts presented in Evanston Northwestern Healthcare 
Corp., combined with the internal documents of hospital executives, 
finally dispelled the notion that nonprofit hospitals should be immune 
from antitrust analysis.
174
 Together, these factors alter the way in which 
hospital mergers are viewed. First, the relevant market definition is altered 
because courts are willing to unbundle services causing individual lines to 
be more closely scrutinized. Second, market efficiencies caused by 
consolidation of services can no longer be speculative or vague. Third, 
hospitals’ justification for consolidation based on charity care has been 
narrowed. And finally, the FTC can now challenge a merger 
postconsolidation that allows for the presentation of real data of market 
abuse as well as the possibility of uncovering damaging internal 
documents. Thus, the direct evidence produced against the health system 
in Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. make it difficult for future 
hospital antitrust defendants to claim that no hospital system would abuse 
market power.
175
 
 
 
 170. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1996).  
 171. Id. at 1296–97. William J. Lynk published two scholarly articles that mirrored his findings. 
See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 
437, 458–59 (1995) [hereinafter Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers]; William J. Lynk, Property Rights 
and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 363, 377 (1994). These studies were 
discredited by other economic studies. See David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition and 
Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87 (1999); 
Emmett B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-Profit and for-Profit Hospital 
Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69 (1999).  
 172. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., 2007 WL 2286195, at *12.  
 173. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 174. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 855.  
 175. See id. The ability for antitrust government agencies to challenge already completed mergers 
as in Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp. is a significant advantage for the FTC. However, there are 
problems with courts granting a remedy in these situations. Id. at 871. The damage may already have 
been done in the hospital merger context because it seems that the dissolution of a merger is ordered 
only when the integral parts have not been integrated. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).  
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III. PPACA’S EFFECT ON HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AND ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS 
The PPACA substantially altered many areas of the health care 
industry. For purposes of hospital mergers and antitrust analysis, two parts 
of the PPACA are important: implementation of Accountable Care 
Organizations (“ACOs”) and Section 9007’s requirement of a community 
health needs assessment relating to charity care. Subpart A will begin with 
a description of ACOs and how they came to be included in the PPACA. 
Although ACOs encourage consolidation of services, this section contends 
that the PPACA will protect against the possibility that ACOs lead to 
market consolidation. Subpart B will describe the evolution of charity care 
provided by nonprofit hospitals. This section argues that, through the 
implementation of Section 9007, the PPACA will require concrete proof 
of charity care, ultimately eliminating a defense used by hospital systems 
in antitrust cases.  
A. Emergence of Accountable Care Organizations  
In the antitrust context, the PPACA’s establishment of ACOs has 
drawn a lot of attention.
176
 For purposes of this section, it is important to 
understand why ACOs were implemented. Traditionally, Medicare doctors 
were paid through a fee-for-service system.
177
 Fee-for-service meant that 
doctors and hospitals are paid for the number of tests and procedures 
performed on an individual patient.
178
 The problem with the fee-for-
service arrangement was that hospitals had an incentive to perform 
additional, potentially unnecessary, tests and procedures because the 
federal government was reimbursing all of the costs.
179
 This led to a 
system of fragmented delivery of service and a system where payments 
rewarded volume and not performance-based service.
180
 Because the cost 
of Medicare was expected to rise exponentially with population trends, 
Congress wanted to provide a program that might reduce this cost.
181
 
Instead of continuing a fee-for-service model, ACOs were established to 
 
 
 176. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 8 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
 177. See Jenny Gold, FAQ on ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-
faq/. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. It is worth noting that hospitals are not reimbursed through Medicare payments at full 
cost. Id. Hospitals cover the bills through a system called charity care. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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provide financial incentives for doctors and hospitals to keep patients 
healthy and out of the hospital.
182
 
Basically, ACOs organize care for groups of Medicare beneficiaries 
and consist of networks of doctors and hospitals.
183
 An ACO’s purpose is 
to coordinate care, reduce costs, improve quality of patient visits, and 
expand access for vulnerable populations.
184
 It accomplishes this goal by 
creating incentives for healthcare providers to work, avoid unnecessary 
tests and procedures, and treat patients together by sharing patient 
information.
185
 The Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”) rewards 
ACOs that have low costs and meets certain standards of performance in 
quality of care.
186
 Under the PPACA, each ACO is required to manage, at 
a minimum, 5000 Medicare beneficiaries for at least three years.
187
 
Accordingly, when a patient goes to a hospital for treatment, the hospital 
will refer the patient to a specialist in the ACO network.
188
 The idea is that 
combining resources among individual practitioners, hospitals, physicians, 
and long-term care facilities will lower costs.
189
  
Critics of the PPACA and ACO implementation are quick to 
acknowledge that ACOs, by nature, establish an integrated network of 
providers that can accelerate hospital mergers and provider 
consolidation.
190
 Theoretically, hospitals and physician practices joining 
forces can increase market share and lead to higher health care costs and 
limited patient choice.
191
 By some estimates, 488 ACOs are operating in 
all fifty states.
192
 Of these 488, over 250 are currently enrolled in the 
MSSP.
193
 It has been reported that new trends of hospital mergers are 
 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.; see also Tara Adams Ragone, Structuring Medicaid Acountable Care Organizations to 
Avoid Antitrust Challenges, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1443, 1469 (2012).  
 185. Gold, supra note 177. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D) (2006); see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
SUMMARY OF FINAL RULE PROVISIONS FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER THE 
MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 5 (2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO_Summary_Factsheet_ICN 
907404.pdf. 
 188. See Gold, supra note 177.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id.  
 191. See id. 
 192. MATTHEW PETERSEN ET AL., LEAVITT PARTNERS, CTR. FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE 
INTELLIGENCE, GROWTH AND DISPERSION OF ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: AUGUST 2013 
UPDATE 4 (2013), available at http://leavittpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Growth-and-
Disperson-of-ACOs-August-20131.pdf.  
 193. Id. at 6. 
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caused by “clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and savings, and 
cash in on the [ACO program’s] incentives.”194 Others suggest that 
providers’ underlying purpose in vertical integration and forming an ACO 
may be “to strengthen their market power over purchasers in the private 
sector.”195 
However, these arguments presuppose that ACOs cannot preserve 
procompetitive effects.
196
 Significantly, federal agencies, including the 
Department of Justice and FTC, have worked closely with the Center for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”) to establish guidelines for 
ACOs in a way that protects against hospital systems abusing market 
share.
197
 These agencies have noted that, in some instances, ACOs would 
not benefit consumers and reduce competition, but rather harm consumers 
with lower quality of care and higher prices.
198
 For that reason, the federal 
antitrust enforcement agencies developed an Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
(“Policy”) to monitor ACO applicants.199 Notably, the government plans 
on protecting “both Medicare beneficiaries and commercially insured 
patients from potential anticompetitive harm while allowing ACOs the 
opportunity to achieve significant efficiencies” in a series of ways.200 First, 
the Policy allows ACOs a significant amount of flexibility in the 
organization of networks.
201
 ACOs allow providers to contract among 
themselves but only to the extent that contracting does not limit 
competition.
202
 Second, the Policy establishes exceptions for rural 
providers that might have special circumstances such as serving a limited 
number of beneficiaries.
203
 Providers that are in more densely populated 
areas, however, are limited in their ability to engage in competitive 
contracting.
204
 Finally, ACOs are required to submit data to CMS for the 
purpose of monitoring ACO performance.
205
 
The agencies make clear that the Policy will only apply to the 
collaborations between independent providers and provider groups as 
 
 
 194. Robert Pear, Consumer Risks Feared as Health Law Spurs Mergers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/health/policy/21health.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 195. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 872.  
 196. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 8–9 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
 197. Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations 
Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 9 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
 204. See Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy, supra note 197.  
 205. Id. 
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ACO participants.
206
 It is not meant to apply to hospital mergers that 
would be covered under the 2010 Guidelines.
207
 Additionally, any sort of 
price fixing or market-share agreements is illegal under antitrust laws.
208
 
Therefore, because of the government antitrust agencies’ involvement with 
and oversight of ACOs, it is unlikely that ACOs will contribute 
significantly to hospital consolidation.
209
  
B. Nonprofit Hospitals Losing Charitable Giving Defense Under the 
PPACA 
In an antitrust analysis, the courts have traditionally granted leniency to 
nonprofit hospital mergers because of the perception that nonprofit 
hospitals are good for consumers, seek to achieve the best results for the 
community, and are not in the business to turn a profit.
210
 As noted in Part 
II, this notion has steadily declined because of recent court cases
211
 and 
changes in government policies. Moreover, studies
212
 and new 
developments in tax-exempt analysis have also worked against this 
notion.
213
 In 2005, Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, questioned the monetary value of hospital tax-
exemptions compared to the benefit that they provide to the community.
214
 
Grassley stated, “Too many [hospitals] do little to nothing. Too often, it 
 
 
 206. Id. “Collaboration” comprises an agreement or set of agreements, other than merger 
agreements, among otherwise independent entities jointly to engage in economic activity. U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG 
COMPETITORS § 1.1 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf. 
 207. Final Statement, supra note 197. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 8–9 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
 210. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1297–98 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
Historically, the argument that nonprofit hospitals do not have an incentive to raise prices was 
especially persuasive. Id. at 1297; see also United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 
(W.D. Va. 1989) (concluding that nonprofit status has a long tradition of free assistance to the 
underserved and therefore has no incentive to increase prices).  
 211. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 2286195, at *53 (F.T.C. Aug. 6, 
2007); see also United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), 
vacated as moot on unrelated grounds, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that there is nothing 
“inherent in the structure of the corporate board or the non-profit status of the hospitals which would 
operate to stop any anticompetitive behavior”).  
 212. See, e.g., Gary J. Young et al., Community Control and Pricing Patterns of Nonprofit 
Hospitals: An Antitrust Analysis, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1051 (2000) (concluding that 
nonprofit hospitals exercise market power in the form of raising prices especially when oversight is 
lacking).  
 213. See Robert Pear, I.R.S. Checking Compliance by Tax-Exempt Hospitals: Inquiry May Bring 
Changes in Standards, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2006, at A15.  
 214. Id. 
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seems that tax-exempt hospitals offer less charitable care and community 
benefit than for-profit hospitals.”215 
Specifically, the way in which the law addresses tax-exempt status and 
charitable giving has led to new provisions in the PPACA.
216
 The PPACA 
has changed the requirements for nonprofit hospitals under Section 9007 
“Additional Requirements for Charitable Hospitals.”217 Before the 
PPACA, the IRS required hospitals to engage in “community benefit 
activities” to receive a federal tax-exemption.218 Among the advantages of 
being considered a tax-exempt entity under the Federal Revenue Code 
were receipt of tax-deductible contributions, federal income tax-
exemption, and the ability to issue tax-free bonds.
219
 It was estimated that 
these federal benefits could amount to $50 billion annually.
220
 In 2005, 
however, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) concluded 
that the tax-exempt policy failed to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable 
for the services they provided to the public.
221
 Particularly, many hospitals 
were not even eligible for tax-exemption based on the value of charity care 
if expressed in cost rather than charges.
222
  
The community benefit standard has been challenged in recent years. It 
was questioned by the Wall Street Journal, which published the abusive 
 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. See PPACA Hearing, supra note 9, at 7 (prepared statement of Prof. Thomas L. Greaney).  
 217. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
 218. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: VARIATION IN STANDARDS 
AND GUIDANCE LIMITS COMPARISON OF HOW HOSPITALS MEET COMMUNITY BENEFITS 
REQUIREMENTS 10 (2008). 
 219. Cecilia M. Jardon McGregor, The Community Benefit Standard for Non-Profit Hospitals: 
Which Community, and for Whose Benefit?, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 302, 310–11 (2007).  
 220. Id. at 311.  
 221. Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Government Hospitals: Uncompensated Care and Other 
Community Benefits: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 19 (2005) 
(statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-743T.  
 222.  Nancy M. Kane, Tax-Exempt Hospitals: What Is Their Charitable Responsibility and How 
Should It Be Defined and Reported?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 459, 465 (2007) (citing studies by the Cong. 
Budget Off., the Gen. Acct. Off, and the Ctr. For Tax and Budget Accountability); see also CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE PROVISION OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS (2006); 
Nonprofit Hospitals: Better Standards Needed for Tax Exemption: Hearing Before the H. Select 
Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong. (statement of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director for National and 
Publich Health Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office); HEATHER O’DONNELL & RALPH MARTIRE, 
CTR. FOR TAX AND BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE TAX EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO 
COOK COUNTY NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS AND THE CHARITY CARE PROVIDED IN RETURN (2006). The 
term “bad debt” is used to describe the financial losses incurred by a hospital regarding the difference 
between what they receive and what it costs to provide the service. O’DONNELL & MARTIRE, supra, at 
2. Conversely, “for-profits refer to [uncompensated care] as bad debt; nonprofits refer to it as charity 
care.” John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and Healthcare For 
the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 433 (2007). 
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billing practices of a number of nonprofit hospitals.
223
 The Wall Street 
Journal reported that nonprofit hospitals were more financially stable than 
for-profit hospitals.
224
 According to one article, seventy-seven percent of 
nonprofit hospitals earned a profit whereas only sixty-one percent of for-
profit hospital earned one.
225
 The articles’ criticism of the community 
benefit standard is supported by case law.
226
 Together, these concerns 
forced Congress to alter the community benefit standard and ensure that 
nonprofit hospitals were providing sufficient levels of charity care through 
Section 9007.
227
  
The PPACA requires that hospitals perform a “community health needs 
assessment” (“CHNA”) every three years to keep their federal nonprofit 
status.
228
 The CHNA was implemented in response to the varied charity 
practices among nonprofit hospitals that allowed hospitals to inflate their 
charges.
229
 Under the CHNA standard, each hospital is required to 
implement a strategic plan to address the community’s health needs by 
making the information publicly available and consulting health experts 
and local community members.
230
 Additionally, under the PPACA, tax-
exempt hospitals are limited in the amount they can charge for care 
 
 
 223. See Amanda W. Thai, Is Senator Grassley Our Savior?: The Crusade Against “Charitable” 
Hospitals Attacking Patients for Unpaid Bills, 96 IOWA L. REV. 761, 771 n.62 (2011).  
 224. John Carreyrou & Barbara Martinez, Nonprofit Hospitals, Once for the Poor, Strike It Rich, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2008, at A1.  
 225. Id. Many states have stripped nonprofit status from hospitals and have more stringent tax-
exemption standards than the federal government. See Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 1131, 1144 (Ill. 2010) (“[T]ax exemption under federal law is not dispositive of 
whether real property is exempt from property tax under Illinois law.”); Dialysis Clinic, Inc. v. Levin, 
938 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio 2010) (reconsideration denied).  
 226. The Supreme Court of Utah revoked the state tax-exemption of several hospitals that used 
less than one percent of their revenues for treatment of the poor. Utah Cnty. v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 278 (Utah 1985). Also, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania required a 
nonprofit hospital to donate a substantial portion of its services to be eligible for state tax status. 
Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1319 (Penn. 1985). Over time, more 
nonprofit hospitals’ tax-exempt statuses were challenged. Colombo, supra note 221, at 435–56. In 
Provena Covenant Medical Center, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the hospital lacked 
availability of charity care to justify tax-exemption. Provena Covenant, 925 N.E.2d at 1145–55. 
 227. Bobby A. Courtney, Hospital Tax-Exemption and the Community Benefit Standard: 
Considerations for Future Policymaking, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 365, 396 (2011).  
 228. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). All 
§ 9007 requirements other than CHNA apply to taxable years beginning after March 23, 2010. Id. 
§ 9007(f).  
 229. See Lisa Kinney Helvin, Note, Caring for the Uninsured: Are Not-for-Profit Hospitals Doing 
Their Share?, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 421, 455 (2008).  
 230. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 9007(a)(1)(3). The PPACA also requires a 
description by each hospital of how it plans to address the needs of the community and an explanation 
of why the hospital has not addressed those needs in the past. Id. § 9007(d).  
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provided to patients who are eligible for financial assistance.
231
 The 
PPACA limits these charges to no more than the amount generally billed 
to insurance companies, which typically bargain for a lower price.
232
 The 
PPACA intends to limit the amount billed to those who qualify for 
financial assistance and to base the charges on negotiated commercial rates 
or Medicare rates.
233
  
Modifying the way in which charity care is approached at the federal 
level will fundamentally change the antitrust analysis.
234
 In Butterworth, 
the court acknowledged that nonprofit hospitals were in the charity 
business and deferred judgment to the healthcare sector to provide for the 
community’s best interest.235 These trends led to a string of cases in which 
antitrust enforcers lost challenges to proposed mergers.
236
 However, now 
that the amount of charity care provided is more closely scrutinized,
237
 
providers will face a higher hurdle when demonstrating charitable benefits 
of the merged entity.
238
 Additionally, before the implementation of the 
PPACA, the uninsured patient’s bills were covered by hospitals through 
charity care.
239 
Now that all persons are required to be insured in some 
form under the PPACA, fewer people will be eligible for charity care 
provided by hospitals.
240
 In summary, the PPACA (1) limits the amount 
 
 
 231. See id. § 9007(a)(1)(5), § 10903(a).  
 232. Id. 
 233. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH 
THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 82 (2010). Under the PPACA, the 
Department of Treasury will review a hospital every three years. Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act § 9007(c). Hospitals that do not meet the CHNA requirement for any year will be fined an 
excise tax of $50,000 and could lose their federal tax-exempt status. Id. § 9007(b). 
 234. See Lizzy Magarian, Note, PPACA: Leveling the Payment Field, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 57 
(2011), available at http://luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/centers/healthlaw/pdfs/advancedirective/pdfs/ issue6/ 
magarian.pdf. 
 235. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 (W.D. Mich. 1996). One scholar 
calls judges’ historic reluctance to apply antitrust principles to health care mergers as “judicial 
disdain” and an outright “rejection of conventional norms that guide competition law.” Thomas L. 
Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 21 HEALTH 
AFF. 185, 187–88 (2002). Greaney notes that case law has limited the government’s “ability to control 
concentration and has given overly permissive signals to providers who are contemplating further 
consolidation.” Id. at 193.  
 236. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman 
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 
(N.D. Cal. 2000); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 
1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as 
moot on unrelated grounds, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).  
 237. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 233.  
 238. See Magarian, supra note 234.  
 239. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 11, at 858. 
 240. See Courtney, supra note 227, at 379.  
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that hospitals can charge for charity-care services and (2) reduces the 
number of people eligible for charity care. Combined, these two effects 
will make it more difficult for hospitals to rely on the charity-care defense.  
Overall, it does not appear that the PPACA will increase hospital 
consolidation. In actuality, it may prevent mergers from occurring in the 
first place.
241
 At first glance, the PPACA’s encouragement of ACOs that 
consist of networks of hospitals and patients seems like a potential 
antitrust problem. However, government agencies developed a framework 
with hospital consolidation in mind and have sought to ensure that ACOs 
would not encourage hospital mergers.
242
 First, hospital mergers and 
ACOs are analyzed under separate frameworks.
243
 Accordingly, the 
PPACA’s encouragement of ACOs is not likely to advance healthcare 
consolidation. Second, the changes in the charity care proposed by the 
PPACA inhibit one of hospital systems’ main defenses: the charity-care 
defense. No longer can hospitals inflate charges to the uninsured and count 
that towards charity-care expenditures.
244
 Moreover, because the 
government is now covering many previously uninsured patients, the 
opportunity for hospitals to provide charity care is reduced.
245
 Therefore, 
the ACO and charity-care portions of the PPACA are not likely to advance 
hospital consolidation.  
CONCLUSION  
Traditionally, hospital mergers were seen as a benefit to consumers. 
The belief was that even if hospital consolidation led to higher prices, any 
additional profits would be funneled back to the community through 
charity care. However, that is no longer the case. After years of nonprofit 
hospitals engaging in price inflation and misreporting charity care, new 
hospital mergers will be more heavily scrutinized, and courts may 
distinguish previous decisions to find an antitrust violation.
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Specifically, the revised version of the 2010 Guidelines shrinks the 
relevant market, separates hospital services into individual lines, and 
requires more than a good faith standard for evidence of proposed 
efficiencies.
247
 Additionally, courts have moved away from the belief that 
nonprofit hospitals will not seek to maximize profits
248
 and have allowed 
post merger challenges on that basis.
249
 Challenging already consummated 
mergers has uncovered direct evidence that hospital executives were 
increasing prices as a monopolist
250
 and has worked to discredit previous 
studies supporting the notion that nonprofit hospitals exhibit a lower 
association between market share and price.
251
 The resurgence of hospital 
merger cases in the federal courts combined with the PPACA provisions—
namely, ACO implementation and redefined charity-care standards—will 
subject mergers to heightened scrutiny. Arguably some damage has 
already been done in the hospital merger setting,
252
 but it is certain that, 
going forward, nonprofit hospitals no longer enjoy the same deference as 
before. 
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